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1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, several Asian leaders have advanced
proposals for the formation of an Asia-Pacific economic
grouping.1
While the idea remains controversial, the
development and apparent success of trading blocs in other
regions, especially the European Union ("EU"), and the sense
that the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") will not sufficiently ensure the viability
of global free trade,2 have forced many countries in the region
to consider the formation of an Asian or Asia-Pacific trading
bloc.3
Interest in an Asia-Pacific regional trading bloc
increased in 1994 after the creation of the North American
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1 Jonathan Manthorpe, Leaders Warm to Pacific Free Trade; Conference
Seems Ready to Agree on a Massive Co-operation Zone, THE GAZETTE
(Montreal), Nov. 15, 1994, at A12. The terms "economic grouping" and
"trading bloc" describe the general phenomenon of a group of nations coming
together to form some type of cooperative arrangement related to trade.
1 For a discussion of the successes and shortcomings of the Uruguay
Round, see Al J. Daniel, Jr., AgriculturalReform: The EuropeanCommunity, The Uruguay Round, and InternationalDispute Resolution, 46 ARK. L.
REV. 873, 885-917 (1994); Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and
Dispute Resolution: Building a Private-InterestsSystem of Justice, 1992
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111.
' The idea of an Asian trading bloc has been proposed consistently in
recent years. See S'pore Calls for Open Regionalism, Xinhua News Agency,
Mar. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Marsha
Stopa, Emerging Markets: Dangers, Opportunity, CRAIN's DETROIT
BUSINESS, Mar. 3, 1995, at 1-5; Kieran Cooke, How Malaysia Discarded its
Fear of China: A New Alliance is Emerging to Counter Western Influence,
FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1995, at 4.
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Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), which many Asian leaders
saw as the United States' response to the same factors.4
Commentators have focused their analysis on the economic
and political consequences of a new Asia-Pacific grouping,
largely ignoring the legal dimension of the inquiry.' This
Article formulates a model that illustrates the extent to which
a legal regime introduced on a regional basis differs
qualitatively from a global regime. The Article then uses the
model to evaluate whether the creation of a regional economic
structure to govern trade between some or all of the AsiaPacific nations would be advantageous.
Recent scholarship on the legal evolution of the European
Union has identified the legal regime that governs trade and
political relations among EU Member States as a new
development in binding supranational law.' While analysts
disagree as to whether the rules governing the behavior of the
Member States and their citizens represent a new system of
"The United States has paid keen attention to the possibility of an Asia-

Pacific trade bloc. See Dave McIntyre, Trade Victories Carrya Cost for U.S.
ForeignPolicy, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Feb. 27, 1995, availablein LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File; Remarks by PresidentClinton to the Canadian
Parliament,U.S. Newswire, Feb. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
' See, e.g., Deborah A. Haas, Note, Out of Others' Shadows: ASEAN
Moves Toward Greater Regional Cooperation in the Face of the EC and
NAFTA, 9 Am.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 809 (1994).
6 See PAUL JOAN GEORGE KAPTEYN & PIETER VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AFTER THE
COMING INTO FORCE OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT 103 (Laurence W.
Gormley ed., 2d ed. 1989); Alberta M. Sbragia, ThinkingAbout the European
Future: The Uses of Comparison, in EURO-POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS AND
POLICYMAKING IN THE "NEW" EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 257 (Alberta M.
Sbragia ed., 1992). Supranational law is law created by and is valid in a
polity that includes more than one nation-state. See John W. Head,
Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multilateral Solutions is
Changing the Characterof "International"
Law, 42 KAN. L. REV. 605, 622
(1994) (footnotes omitted). Such boundary-transcending legal systems
include the basic system of international law as well as regional systems of
international law. While regional legal systems emerge from conventional
international law instruments, supranational law includes the interstitial
law created by treaty institutions based on the applicable treaties; the
European Union and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice
represent the best examples of this phenomenon. See J.H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2426 (1991). Although in
some sense all such law could also be considered international law, the term
supranational refers to the distinction between the law directly constituted
by treaty and the law endogenously developed by supranational institutions.
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law or a strengthened version of traditional international law,
there is general agreement that the legal constraints imposed
on EU Member States are a significant break from the past
state of international affairs." Indeed, one commentator has
hypothesized that the development of this legal system was
driven by an internal institutional dynamic that pushed the
bounds of the European Union beyond those attainable by
treaty.8
The common legal heritage, political will, and traditional
economic interdependence of the European nations have
contributed to the successful development of a binding EU
There are indications, however, that the
legal regime.'
institutional structure of the European Union also contributed
to the expansion of its legal competence and enabled the
European Union to impose a set of legally binding norms on its
Member States.' 0
Outside of the European Union, the GATT is the principal
legal framework governing global transnational trade."
Even prior to completion of the Uruguay Round, the GATT
appeared to be an unsatisfactory vehicle for Asia-Pacific
countries to achieve their goal of free trade. 2 In light of the
political controversies that almost prevented the resolution of
the Uruguay Round and now threaten to impede the progress
of the post-Uruguay Round regime, the GATT seems even less
likely to promote an effective free trade regime in the
region. 3
While proponents of an Asia-Pacific economic grouping
For a discussion of the binding nature of EU law, see infra Section 3.2.
8 See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2449-50.
See Peter Lange, The Politics of the Social Dimension, in EUROPOLITICS: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE "NEW" EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 225 (Alberta M. Sbragia ed., 1992).
10

David R. Cameron, The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences, in

EURO-POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE "NEW" EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY 23 (Alberta M. Sbragia ed., 1992).
1 See Daniel, supra note 2, at 885.
12 See Frank B. Gibney, Creating a Pacific Community: A Time to
Bolster Economic Institutions, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1993, at 20, 23.
ISSee UruguayRound Agreement is Reached, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 49, at 2103 (Dec. 15, 1993) (describing the contentious nature of the
Uruguay Round) [hereinafter Uruguay Round Agreement]; Gibney, supra
note 12, at 23 (noting that "[1]ately, given GATT's problems, there has been
Asia-Pacific economic institutions").
of building
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support the GATT system, even the GATT's strongest
adherents recognize its institutional and structural
weaknesses. 4 Much of the motivation for an Asia-Pacific
economic grouping arises from the structural inadequacies in
the GATT that result in a weak legal regime governing
international trade.' 5
In considering whether to form a regional economic bloc,
Asia-Pacific nations should consider the nature of the legal
regime contemplated and whether it is plausible, politically
desirable, and well suited for the types of trade-related
problems the member countries hope to resolve. This Article
analyzes the correlation between the structural regime chosen
(e.g., customs union, looser free trade area, or an overarching
global regime) and the legal and institutional developments
that are likely to occur in the context of such a regime. This
comparison will be used to evaluate the situation in the AsiaPacific region and discern the extent to which the constituent
nations are amenable to this type of structural development.
This Article then identifies the aspects of the structural
alternatives best suited to a regional economic grouping among
Asia-Pacific nations. Finally, this Article assesses how the
legal paradigm can be incorporated into the larger policy
debate over an Asia-Pacific grouping.
Section Two presents the general scheme of the GATT and
addresses the structural and political problems that have
caused Asia-Pacific nations to question whether the GATT can
satisfactorily resolve their international trade problems.
Section Two also discusses the reforms and improvements
adopted in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. Section Three
addresses the European Union and identifies the aspects of its
"See Gibney, supra note 12, at 23.
1 See Seth Goldschlager & Dominique Jacomet, Business: Be Wary of
the New Group, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, § 3, at 9; Deborah Eby, Rating
GATT- Trade Pact's Breakthroughs and Barriers,America's Network, Jan.
1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Uruguay Round
reforms, most notably the World Trade Organization ("WTO") attempt to
meet the current system's inadequacies. UruguayRound Agreement, supra
note 13, at 2103. The WTO will serve as the institutional mainstay of the
GATT system, "pullting] together into a single institutional framework the
GATT as it now exists, all arrangements concluded under GATT auspices[,]
and all other bodies emanating from the Uruguay Round." Id. While the
WTO will likely improve the operation of the current system, it is too early
to assess its effectiveness.
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structure and development that have enabled the European
Union to become a more legalistic regime. Section Four
analyzes the extent to which existing regional structures in
the Asia-Pacific region have the potential to evolve into a
regional trading bloc and develop binding supranational law.
Section Four also includes an analysis of other potential
groupings of Asian or Asia-Pacific states. Section Five
explores those institutional characteristics cited in Section
Two as having contributed to the successful development of the
European Union that may be incorporated into an Asia-Pacific
grouping. This analysis will include possible formulations of
the legal/political bargain that participants might achieve.
Finally, Section Six discusses how the addition of the legal
dimension to the development of regional trading blocs
changes the existing analysis and explores what it suggests for
the future.
2. THE GATT

The nations of the Asia-Pacific region have collectively
realized the necessity of maintaining global free trade to
insure the continued prosperity of wealthier nations and
opportunities for the growth of less developed nations in the
region."6 While these countries have declared their desire to
expand the current GATT system, they also have realized that
the GATT may not be the means of achieving this objective.1"
The increasing frustration of some EU and U.S. policymakers
over their inability to eliminate trade barriers in Asia, and the
growing feeling that GATT free trade is a one-way street, have
led EU and U.S. policymakers to consider other mechanisms,
most notably regional arrangements, as either additions to or
Further, the
substitutes for the GATT framework. 8
16

H.B. Junz & Clemens Boonekamp, What is at Stake in the Uruguay
Round, FIN. & DEV., June 1991, at 10, 11.
17 Peter Kenevan & Andrew Winden, Flexible Free Trade: The ASEAN
Free Tade Area, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 224 (1993).
ISGood in Parts, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1993, at 60, 61. In 1992, sixteen
regional trading arrangements were notified to the GATT (excluding
NAFTA, which had not yet been ratified). Id. While many of these pacts
were between formerly communist countries in Eastern Europe and the
countries of Western Europe, some were from Asia and Latin America,
reflecting the growing trend toward trade liberalization in developing
countries.
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difficulty faced by the European Union and the United States
in agreeing on the limited specific improvements presented in
the Uruguay Round, as well as the amorphous nature of the
WTO, has made Asia-Pacific leaders question the efficacy and
value of the GATT system.'"
The GATT system of international trade regulation has
widened the scope of international free trade.
While
successive rounds have resulted in a considerable reduction in
average tariff rates among the contracting parties, the GATT
legal regime has not substantially lessened non-tariff
barriers." Average tariff rates have reached a point where
further comprehensive reductions are unlikely to have a
substantial effect on overall free trade, except in specific
protected sectors."' In addition, many governments have
found non-tariff barriers to be an effective method of
protecting domestic industries without creating GATT
compliance problems.22 According to some commentators,
GATT remedial measures, such as escape clause actions and
anti-dumping sanctions, have mutated from their original
purpose of ensuring a level playing field into devices for
protecting domestic industries.23 In light of these problems
with the current international trading regime, the GATT has
two systemic flaws. First, although interested officials,
policymakers, and scholars have identified these problems, the
GATT has not yet developed an institutional framework to
address them on an international legal level.24 Second, in the
political realm, continuing discord between the United States
and the European Union delayed progress in the Uruguay

10 See Gibney, supra note 12, at 23.
20 Junz & Boonekamp, supra note 16, at 10-11.

The Asian trading
nations have had a mixed history with non-tariff barriers, although they
have used them extensively to protect their infant industries and satisfy
domestic sector demands for exclusive markets. The Asian nations have
also been increasingly targeted by industrialized nations' non-tariffbarriers,
especially those of the European Union. Id. at 11.
21

Id at 13.

22 Ida

21 See id. at 13. Asian nations have been the most seriously affected by
these devices; the United States, the European Union, Australia, and
Canada have "initiated over 1,000 investigations, of which some 50 percent
have24 led to action." Id.

Id
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Round,2 5 and will likely impede post-Uruguay Round
reforms.2" Many areas of contentious disagreement were not
definitively resolved in the Uruguay Round, and thus remain
the subject of conflict within new GATT structures like the
WTO. 7
2.1. Institutional Weaknesses of the GATT
Since the beginning of the GATT process, Contracting
Parties have successively reduced their tariffs on
manufactured products to the point where the average rates
for the big three economic players (the United States, the
European Union, and Japan) are approximately five
percent.2' Despite recent progress in reducing tariffs, many
countries still find that their exporters are impeded by a
myriad of non-tariff barriers. 29 The substantive provisions of
the GATT aim to eliminate non-tariff barriers as well as
reduce tariffs.3 0
Parties to the Tokyo Round of the GATT addressed nontariff barriers, including subsidies, preference for domestic
suppliers in government procurement, and anti-dumping
actions. 3 ' Although the relevant provisions of the GATT are
not as exhaustive as comparable provisions in the Treaty of
Rome,3" they are nonetheless extensive enough to eliminate
certain non-tariff barriers if enforced.3 3
Uruguay Round Agreement, supra note 13, at 2103.
Shada Islam, Goodbye GATT Asia Welcomes Creationof New World
Trade Body, FAR E. ECON. REv., Dec. 30, 1993, at 79, 80. The areas into
which the GATT aims to expand its coverage include trade-related
environmental issues, national domestic competition policies, and labor
standards. Id. All of these policymaking areas traditionally have been
domestic concerns and will probably be as difficult to resolve as the
agricultural dispute that almost prevented a successful conclusion to the
Uruguay
Round. See id.
27
Id.
± See Junz & Boonekamp, supra note 16, at 13.
2
Id. at 13-14. The term "non-tariff barriers" encompasses everything
from quotas to subtle differences in domestic product standards to economic
policies that restrict market access to foreign products. Id.
" See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
31 Junz & Boonekamp, supra note 16, at 10.
32 Daniel, supra note 2, at 899.
25
26

3 See id.
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One institutional weakness of the GATT is that it
contemplates interstate bargaining on a traditional
international level as the primary means of dispute
resolution. 4 Compliance with the GATT is seen more as the
resolution of differences between disputing states than as the
enforcement of legal rights.3 5 The power dynamic in the
resolution of GATT disputes thus replicates that which exists
in the international political realm, where a nation's
bargaining power is a product of its economic or political
influence rather than the legal merits of its position. 6 In
such a system, powerful nations often triumph regardless of
the underlying legality of their position.3" This political
dimension of the bargaining context. has prevented GATT's
rules from evolving to the same extent as the rules of an entity
like the European Union, in which institutional innovations
have been endogenously driven by the actions of the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") and the Commission, entities within
the European Union but outside of the normal interstate
bargaining process.3"
Another flaw in the GATT is the absence of an institutional
identity. Under the GATT's dispute resolution system, the
Contracting Parties appoint a panel of mediators from the
The
affected countries to resolve a trade dispute.3 9
Contracting Parties adopt the panel's resolution by consensus,
" David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 407, 409-10 (1993). Only after
bilateral consultation and negotiations fail are disputes referred to the
Contracting Parties acting as a body. Id. If not resolved there, the dispute
may be referred to a panel of independent experts. Id.
35 OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL

TRADE SYSTEM 75-76 (1985).
S Daniel, supra note 2, at 907.
37

Id

See id. at 900-04 (describing the role of the ECJ in strengthening and
regulating the European Union). The distinction between law and politics
in any legal system is elusive and somewhat illusory. See LONG, supra note
35, at 81-83 (describing the way that political and trade/legal problems are
resolved by the GATT dispute settlement procedure). This Article will show,
however, that there is a clear distinction between the resolution of trade
disputes through reference to and interpretation of substantive rules by a
neutral arbitrator in the EU context, and the quintessentially political
process that occurs between GATT disputants under the current panel
system.
" Huntington, supra note 34, at 410.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss1/3
38

1995]

ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC GROUPING

which means that one member can veto its decision.4" Even
if a decision is adopted, the remedies a panel can effectively
invoke are limited.41 Thus, unlike the European Union,
which has a permanent adjudicatory body (the ECJ), the GATT
does not have a comparable uniform body before which its
members can vindicate their rights and obligations in a legal
environment.
A third institutional weakness of the GATT, related to its
4
lack of a permanent adjudicative body, is its private nature. 2
A private institutional framework attempts to replicate the
arrangements to which its parties would agree among
themselves, and does not independently initiate or promote
change. 43
In contrast, a public-oriented entity has a
"communal vision" and mobilizes its institutional powers in
order to achieve this vision.44
The private interest
characteristics of the GATT 45 prevent it from expanding free
trade to the extent that public institutional structures like the
European Union have been able to accomplish.48
In order to revitalize free trade, the world community must
remedy the institutional weaknesses of the current GATT
system or develop a new system that avoids these flaws. The
WTO may prove to be an effective institution in overcoming
some of these weaknesses. 4' Nevertheless, until the actual
structure is implemented, it is difficult to assess the likelihood
of the WTO's success. To the extent that its decisionmaking
and other institutional structures labor under the same
Id. at 411.
LONG, supra note 35, at 77 (noting that while retaliatory measures
such as suspension of trade concessions are an option, the one time such
sanctions were applied the affected country did not withdraw from GATT as
was expected).
42 See Kenneth W. Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay
Round
and Beyond, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 31, 36 (1992).
43
Jd at 34.
44Id. at 35.
45
1Id. at 36-38 (noting six key ways in which GATT is based on a private
model yet reaches toward some public goals).
46 Daniel, supra note 2, at 900-07; Weiler, supra note 6, at 2478-82.
47 See William D. Hunter, WTO Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and
CountervailingDuty Cases, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON
40

41

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT

1994 (PLI Corp. & Practice Course

Handbook Series No. 547, 1994) (outlining the proposed structure of dispute
resolution under the WTO), available in Westlaw, JLR Database.
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political constraints as the current structure,4" it is likely
that the WTO will face similar difficulties.
2.2. Uruguay Round Reforms
Some of the substantive and institutional weaknesses of
the GATT were addressed in the Uruguay Round.4
Agriculture was brought under the coverage of the GATT
system in the Uruguay Round.5 0 Under the new provisions,
countries currently protecting their agricultural sectors
through non-tariff barriers will convert the non-tariff barriers
into tariffs affording the same degree of protection.5 1 This
process of "tariffication" will be followed by a progressive
reduction in tariffs. 2 The countries also must reduce the
level of export subsidies that they provide to farmers. 3
The Uruguay Round agreement also extended GATT's
coverage to include textiles, an industry previously governed
by the protectionist Multi-Fiber Arrangement.5 4
The
Uruguay Round provides for a phase out of current trade
restrictions on textiles over a ten-year period.55 The new
agreement also incorporates other new areas into the GATT
structure, including foreign direct investment restrictions,5 6
intellectual property protection issues,5 7 and services.5 8
Thus, in terms of substantive coverage, the Uruguay Round
revitalized the GATT's potential as a catalyst for further
liberalization of international trade.
The Uruguay Round also expanded the GATT's coverage of

48 Id
41

See Abbott, supra note 2, at 111.
oUruguay Round Agreement, supra note 13, at 2103-04.

s Id. at 2104.

2 Id.

63 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.

68 Id. at 2105.

Id. at 2105-06.
" Id. at 2105. The new General Agreement on Trade in Services now
governs services supplied to one country by another, and extends the
general GATT principles of most-favored-nation ("MFN") status,
nondiscrimination, and transparency. Id.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss1/3
67
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non-tariff barriers. " The new agreement limits the use of
safeguards as an instrument to protect domestic industries60
by requiring additional procedural steps and limiting the
extent and duration of safeguard quotas."' It also addresses
voluntary export restraints, a tactic countries have used to
avoid the existing requirements for safeguard actions.62 The
final agreement also tightens the requirements for a
determination of dumping in an effort to limit abuse of the
anti-dumping mechanism. 3
As well as strengthening the substantive provisions of the
GATT, participants in the Uruguay Round also attempted to
improve the GATT's dispute resolution procedure.64 The
GATT General Council ("General Council") 5 was created as
part of the new institutional structure of the WTO.6" Under
the new rules, the decision of a GATT panel automatically
becomes binding unless all WTO members block its
adoption.67 This shift in the burden of ratification would
increase the "legal" nature of the panels' decisions by making
it more difficult for contracting parties to prevent panel
decisions from becoming effective. The General Council will
enjoy a stronger legal foundation than the existing structure

" Id. at 2103-04.

60 GATT, supra note 30, art. XIX.
61 Id.
62 See id.
63 Id. at 2104-05; Islam, supra note 26, at 79. The new rules raise the
burden of proof for demonstrating injury to domestic producers and require
the termination of an anti-dumping investigation upon a determination that
the dumping margin is de minimis. UruguayRound Agreement, supra note
13, at 2104. In addition, the new rules introduce a "sunset" provision that
requires the discontinuation of anti-dumping tariffs after five years unless
there is a subsequent finding of dumping. Islam, supra note 26, at 79.
64 Abbott, supra note 2, at 117.
65 The General Council will run the WTO; it "will act as a dispute
settlement body, and will establish subsidiary bodies dealing specifically
with goods, services, and intellectual property." UruguayRoundAgreement,
supra note 13, at 2103.
"'Id.at 2103. The WTO encompasses the current GATT framework and
all GATT-related trade arrangements (e.g., the Government Procurement
Code and other Tokyo Round Codes and all the regimes created by the
Uruguay Round). Id.
67 See Hunter, supra note 47, at 2. Previously, if any member objected
to the adoption of a panel report, the adoption would be blocked. See supra
notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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and will also play a role in strengthening the GATT's dispute
resolution procedures."8
Despite these advances in the quality of the dispute
resolution process, there remain considerable limitations to its
effectiveness. Contracting parties may be able to persuade the
General Council to rescind an adverse finding. Further, the
remedy for aggrieved parties remains limited. Thus, even
after the Uruguay Round reforms, the GATT remains a
predominantly private oriented institutional structure.
2.3. Political Weaknesses
A dispute between the United States and the European
Union during the Uruguay Round illustrates the problems
inherent in the GATT's preference for a political approach.
The dispute, centered around the comparatively minor area of
agriculture, jeopardized the progress of the entire Uruguay
Round.6 9 Key countries seem to have weakened in their
resolve to give priority to improving the GATT system."0 In
the year prior to the completion of the Uruguay Round, both
the European Union and United States arguably shifted some
of their attention towards regional developments in the
European Union and North America, and gave less priority
than before to resolving political gridlock in the GATT."
This phenomenon has indicated to Asian leaders that the
GATT framework on which they were depending might not be
an effective means for achieving their goals.7" A last-minute
settlement between the United States and the European Union
did little to alleviate these doubts.7 3
In light of these political problems, Asian nations have
68 See Hunter, supra note 47, at 2.

e Negotiators Clear Path to GATT Pact by Sweeping Away Remaining

Differences, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2106, 2106-07 (Dec. 15,
1993). Even with their compromise over agriculture, the European Union
and the United States failed to reach agreement on a number of other issues
including audiovisual rights, aircraft subsidies, financial services, and
maritime services. Id. The European Union and the United States agreed
to disregard these areas of disagreement in order to complete the Round.
Id.

70 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
71 Id.
72

71

See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
See Good in Parts,supra note 18, at 61.
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discussed creating an Asian regional economic bloc. 4 Due to
the doubts of certain key countries in the region, advocates of
such a grouping have limited the scope of their proposal."
Proponents of an Asian economic bloc argue that such a
grouping might have a positive effect within the current
political framework of the GATT as a force for revitalization of
the GATT and the expansion of free trade. 6 While the
development of an Asian economic bloc could benefit the
current GATT political situation by creating a coalition of
nations devoted to freer trade within the GATT, a core group
of Asian or Asia-Pacific nations might also be able to cure
some of the institutional weaknesses of the GATT system.
Before proceeding with this inquiry, however, it is useful to
consider the single supranational structure that has resolved
many of the institutional weaknesses that characterize the
GATT and built a more effective free trade regime: the
European Union.
3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE GROWTH OF HARD TRADE LAW

Like the GATT, the European Union made its principal
goal the eradication of barriers to trade and the use of
economic interdependence to ensure regional economic
prosperity and political stability." Unlike the GATT, the
European Union has succeeded in eliminating almost all direct
barriers to trade within its region, and has gone beyond its
original economic sphere to become the forum for resolution of
other trade-related transnational problems facing its Member
States. 8
While the scope of the European Union is more ambitious

"' Susumu Awanohara, Loose-Knit Family, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 2,
1993, at 12.
This was the United States' strategy at the November 1993 APEC
summit, discussed infra Section 4.1. The United States used the summit to
rally support for a speedy and successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round,
and to put pressure on the recalcitrant European Union. See Awanohara,
supra note 74, at 13.
" Daniel, supra note 2, at 898-99.

78 IdL at 899-904.
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than that of the GATT, 9 certain of its systemic
characteristics could be adaptable to either a GATT-type
structure or a regional structure in Asia. For this reason,
analysis of the legal/political development 0 of the European
Union reveals means by which a transnational framework to
govern trade can become more effective. If some aspects of
this development are amenable to a smaller group of nations,
then the success of the European Union as a legal framework
might supply a further argument for Asia-Pacific nations to
proceed towards a regional grouping.
In analyzing this legal/political dynamic and its role in the
evolution of EU law and institutions, the theory of Joseph
Weiler is particularly helpful. 1 By showing the relationship
between political developments during the history of the
European Union and legal developments in the decisions of the
ECJ, as well as the actions of the Member States in complying
with such judgments, Weiler describes the evolution of the
"hard law" of the European Union. 2 He argues that a large
part of the development of hard law was driven by the
interaction between the institutional and substantive
characteristics of the European Union, rather than in the
political context of interstate bargaining towards a legal
dispute resolution process more akin to the character of
domestic legal systems.8"
3.1. The European Union as a Public Institution
One prominent difference between the European Union and
the GATT is the European Union's placement in the public/
private dichotomy.8 4 The European Union has evolved into
a more public-oriented grouping with a "communal vision," and
has adopted institutional mechanisms to further this vision. 5
79

1d. at

899.
The term legal/political conveys the sense in which politics is
implicated, but the legal aspect of the dynamic is clearly as important. This
conception of law "encompasses a discourse that is much wider than doctrine
and norms." Weiler, supra note 6, at 2409.
80

81 Id
12 Id.

at 2410-53.

83

See id. at 2409-10.

84

For a discussion of the public/private dichotomy, see supra Section 2.1.
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The European Union has independent institutions that often
act on the basis of their evaluation of the European Union's
interests rather than the interests of one Member State."6
The two most important EU institutions are the
Commission and the Council of Ministers ("Council").8" The
Commission is the quasi-executive, quasi-legislative branch of
the European Union. 8 Commission members are required to
act in furtherance of the interests of the European Union as a
whole."
The Commission enjoys the "right of initiative" in
EU lawmaking,90 plays a crucial role in influencing the
majority voting of the Council,9 and serves as the enforcer
and administrator of EU law.92
The primary legislative body of the European Union is the
Council. 3 While the membership and negotiating dynamic
of the Council correspond to those of a multilateral treaty (i.e.,
the traditional interstate political bargaining process)94 there
are elements of a public-oriented structure in the content and
process of the Council's decisionmaking. The scope of the
Council's authority is limited by the Treaties that define the
substantive law of the European Union, perhaps because
Council members view the Community interest "through the
spectacles of national interest."95 Further, from a legal
perspective, decisions of the Council are not international
agreements but measures of Community law.96
The Commission serves as the enforcement arm of the
European Union. It has the power to bring Member States
that are not in compliance with the constitutive treaties or
Case for Sidestepping the GATT, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 405, 437 (1994)
(footnotes omitted).
" See id.
87 KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 103.
"' For a description of the Commission's role, see id. at 125-130.
8' Id. at 108-09.
so Id. at 126.
"' See id.
92 Id. at 125-130.
93

1CL at 124-25.

"' B. Guy Peters, Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the
EuropeanCommunity, in EURO-POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING
IN THE "NEw" EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 75, 78 (Alberta M. Sbragia ed., 1992).
96 KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 104.
9' See Peters, supra note 94, at 100-03.
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other provisions of substantive community law before the
ECJ.97 This differs from the GATT political paradigm in that
the Commission may prosecute a Member State for
noncompliance even when other Member States do not wish to
act.9" This power enables the Commission to enforce the
European Union's laws by bringing a test case before the ECJ
and then prevailing upon the Member States to abide by the
Court's decision.99 Thus, the nature and extent of the
Commission's power ensure that the decisional law of the ECJ
and its interstitial rulemaking are driven by a conception of
the public and systemic needs of the European Union, rather
than the parochial interests of EU Member States.
The public's conception of the European Union arguably
has resulted in expansion of the ECJ's realm of influence.
Weiler identifies the ECJ's adoption of the doctrine of implied
powers as an advance that allowed the European Union to
legislate in areas that were not originally part of its
competence, when such an expanded scope was necessary to
achieve a legitimate goal of the European Union.100 This
flexibility enabled the European Union to address areas of free
trade that touch on the sovereignty of Member States, through
harmonization of Member State laws and the development of
EU-wide law in some areas.' 1 While the ECJ justified the
jurisdictional expansion on policy and pragmatic grounds," 2
the fact that the Commission served as an advocate in some
"

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY art. 169

[hereinafter EEC TREATY]; Weiler, supra note 6, at 2419-20.
98
See KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 273-74.
Other Member States may be hesitant to take action because they are guilty
of the same or another type of non-compliance, or they may not want to
"rock the boat" over the issue. Of course, the Commission also has the
discretion not to bring suit against a non-complying Member State if it feels
that such an action would not be in the interest of the Community. Id.
" See Martin Shapiro, The EuropeanCourtof Justice, in EURO-POLITICS:
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE "NEW" EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 123,

124-28. Member States usually accept determinations by the Court and
hence honor their community obligations once an issue has been
adjudicated. Weiler, supra note 6, at 2429. For a discussion of the Member
States' reasons for compliance, see infra Section 3.2.
10
101

Weiler, supra note 6, at 2416.
Id- at 2416-17.

102 Id. at 2416 (nothing that the ECJ sidestepped the presumptive rule
in international law that treaties must be interpreted to minimize
encroachment on state sovereignty).
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instances should not be overlooked.0 3
Further, the
Commission's conception of the European Union also
influenced the extent to which the ECJ was prepared to
expand its legal reach."°
In summary, the institutional structure of the European
Union strengthens its public-oriented nature. The European
Union's mechanisms for developing and enforcing the
communal interests of the Member States allowed the ECJ to
expand the scope of EU substantive law.'
The Commission
was able to direct much of the development of the EU
decisional law towards fulfilling EU interests0 6 and
ensuring that Member States comply with their legal
obligations.' 7 The institutional strength of the public-oriented
bodies contributed to the growth of community ethos, which in
turn made the ECJ more willing to increase the extent of the
European Union's influence.'
3.2. Enforcement Powers of the European Union and the
Hardeningof Community Law
The European Union's power to enforce its substantive law
differentiates it from the GATT and explains the European
Union's greater effectiveness in eliminating barriers to free
trade. This dimension of the European Union's power allows
the Commission to undertake its institutional role with confidence that the Member State involved in a dispute will comply
with the ECJ's determination or even settle the dispute by
agreeing to obey the relevant provision.0 " European Union
Member States obey the rulings of the ECJ and treat their EU
obligations as binding."0

'

03

See D. LASOK

& J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 183-95
104

See id.

(4th ed. 1987).

See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2416.
See id. at 2413-17.
107 See KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 275-80.
108 See id. at 310-49.
10

106

'o' See id. at 275-80. Before bringing a member state before the ECJ, the
Commission must issue a reasoned opinion and give the member state an
opportunity to evaluate its arguments and respond. EEC TREATY art. 169;
KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 274-75.
110 See KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 310-49.
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Another aspect of the EU system' that ensures nations'
compliance with substantive legal provisions is the
preliminary reference from a national court.'
Under this
procedure, a national court may, or in some instances must,
refer to the ECJ any issues of EU law the interpretation of
which are essential to the resolution of the dispute."' The
preliminary reference procedure enables individuals to appeal
to their national courts for the enforcement of their rights
under EU law."' By vesting individuals with specific rights
derived from the constitutive law of the European Union and
supplying them with the means to enforce such rights, the
European Union effectively makes every citizen a private
attorney-general, thus greatly enlarging the scope of its
enforcement power." 4 The Member State courts have by
and large accepted this intervention into their sovereign
functioning." 5 This means that in many cases it is the
national courts that compel Member States to honor their EU
obligations." 6
The ECJ also has adopted legal doctrines that have
increased acceptance of the EU legal system. The doctrine of
direct effect has contributed to the success of the preliminary
reference device by expanding the scope of EU-derived legal
rights that individuals can vindicate in their national
courts." 7 Under this doctrine, the Member States may no
longer choose not to implement measures adopted by the
European Union." 8 The doctrine of direct effect illustrates
the difference between the character of EU law and typical
...See EEC TREATY art. 177.
112

Id.

"13 See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2413-15. This approach departs from the
classical conception of international legal obligations as directed towards
states. Id.
114 See id. at 2414.
"r See id at 2426-27. Weiler suggests that the ability of the national
judiciaries to develop the law which would bind them was a key factor in the
member states' acquiescence to the intervention. Id.
" 6 Id- at 2421.
117 Id. at 2413. Direct effect is a rule of construction that provides that
when an EU substantive legal provision (whether it be a treaty, a directive,
or a regulation) is sufficiently "clear, precise and self-sufficient," it can be
enforced by a national court even in the absence of national legislation
transforming it into national law. Id.
11 Shapiro, supra note 99, at 126.
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international treaty law: under the latter legal rights and
obligations apply only to states and not to individuals."' 9
Another way in which the ECJ has increased the scope of
EU law beyond that of normal treaty-based international law
is through the doctrine of supremacy.1 2 °
This doctrine
ensures that where there is a conflict between EU law and the
law of a Member State, the EU measure will control. 1 '
Together with the doctrine of direct effect, the doctrine of
supremacy ensures that EU law will take precedence over
conflicting national laws.'2 2
These doctrinal devices have strengthened EU law and the
public character of the European Union. It is important to
examine what motivated the various players to accept a
system that encroached on traditional areas of state
sovereignty. The explanation for this acquiescence includes
both the legitimacy of the EU institutions driving the change
and the political motivations of the participating governments.
3.3. Legitimacy of Institutions
Member States' compliance with binding ECJ rulings has
been crucial to the development of the EU legal system. While
national courts became the ultimate enforcers of ECJ decisions
pursuant to the Article 177 preliminary reference
provision,"' Member States have also complied with
decisions of the ECJ that were independent of their domestic
legal systems.12
One reason for this compliance is the
legitimacy of the ECJ as an institution.'2 5 The ECJ is

"' Weiler, supra note 6, at 2413.
120 Id
at 2414-15. Although the EEC Treaty does not contain a
supremacy clause, the doctrine of supremacy provides that any EU law
takes precedence over the conflicting law of any Member State. Id.

1 Id,
122 See id. at 2415.
12 Id at 2425. For a discussion of the use of the Article 177 preliminary
reference, see Shapiro, supra note 99, at 126-27.
124 Weiler, supra note 6, at 2425.
12, Id- Even though the constitutive treaties of the European Union
provide for mandatory jurisdiction for certain actions involving the
Commission's prosecution of a Member State for non-compliance with
Community law, there is no ex ante reason to believe that the Member
States
theScholarship
determinations.
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composed primarily of former judges from the Member
States. 2 ' Often these judges are senior jurists from the
highest courts in their respective countries. 1 ' As a result,
both Member State courts that make Article 177 references
and Member State governments have great respect for the
2 ' This is in marked contrast to
determinations of the ECJ."
the status of "binding" resolutions of GATT panels, which are
regularly ignored.'2 9
The second source of the ECJ's legitimacy is the grounding
of its determinations in law. The ECJ adopted a teleological
approach to interpreting the law, with the aim of developing
a coherent legal framework to govern the emerging European
Union.13 0 The locus of the ECJ's legitimacy was in the view
of law as a binding norm.' 3 '
Thus, the fact that an
authoritative and respected legal body generated judgments
based on strict legal reasoning lent credibility to the ECJ's
32
pursuit of a legitimate collective legal system."
Finally, Weiler identifies the judicial empowerment
provided by the Article 177 procedure as a crucial incentive
that enabled judges in domestic legal systems to circumvent
their judicial superiors or political counterparts by appealing
points of European law to the ECJ.'3 3 As Member State
courts accepted this new structure, they created a momentum
that led other Member States to accept the new role of the
ECJ.

34

126 The ECJ's judges must be "persons whose independence is beyond
doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment to judicial

office." EEC TREATY art. 168a. Although not required by EU law, it has
become the practice to have one judge from each of the Member States. See
KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 147.
127 See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2425.
128 See id.
129 See Abbott, supra note 2, at 113-19.
130 See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2416.
131 See KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 310-49.
See id.
133

See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2426. In states without judicial review,

domestic courts found themselves for the first time able to refer issues to the
ECJ, and then to use the ECJ's ruling to strike down national law. Even in
states with limited judicial review, Article 177 permitted lower courts to
strike down (through preliminary references to the ECJ) laws made by the
political branches. Id.
134 See id. at 2425.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss1/3

1995]

ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC GROUPING

It is difficult to separate these factors because each affected
the others. It is thus more illuminating to consider them as a
whole. While this constellation of factors accounts for many of
the unique features of the EU legal order, the most important
element is the link between these institutional and structural
characteristics and the nature of the legal/political bargain
struck by the Member States.
3.4. Legal/PoliticalParadigm
3.4.1. The FoundationalPeriodof the European Union
Although the Treaty of Rome, the constitutive treaty of the
European Union, provided for majority voting in the
Council,' 35 the idea of majority voting was not immediately
accepted by the Member States; rather, a system of unanimous
voting was adopted.'36
The decisive power of the
Commission was assumed by intergovernmental bodies like the
Committee of Permanent Representatives ("COREPER"), in
which Member States bargained at a more traditional political
level.13
At the same time, the European Union was
strengthening the reach of its laws through the doctrinal
developments described previously. 33
Weiler posits a
relation between the degree of participation that the Member
States enjoyed in the EU lawmaking process as a result of the
136 See LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 103, at 198-99. Majority voting does
not mean that fifty percent of the member states can pass legislation, but
rather that the votes of each Member State were weighted in such a way so

as to allow several Member States to veto proposed measures.
The current system gives the large countries, Germany, Britain, France,
and Italy, ten votes each. Spain has eight votes; Holland, Greece, Belgium,
and Portugal have five; Denmark and Ireland have three; and Luxembourg
has two. The Maths of Post-MaastrichtEurope, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993,
at 51. A measure requires 54 of the 76 total votes to pass. As a result of
this system, all of the large states voting together cannot outvote the small
states, and the small states need the support of at least three large states
to obtain the qualified majority. Id. This system will hereinafter be
referred to as majority voting.
138 EEC TREATY art. 145.
13 See Peters, supra note 94, at 80.
COREPER is comprised of
representatives of each of the Member States who handle the daily business'
of the Council. Weiler, supra note 6, at 2424 n.45.
13 These developments include the doctrines of direct effect and
supremacy. For a discussion of these doctrines, see supra notes 117-22 and
accompanying text.
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unanimity requirement and the Member States' willingness to
acquiesce to the increasing reach of EU law.13 9 On one level,
the fact that each Member State could veto legislation ensured
that no Member State would have to adopt an unpopular
provision.140 Thus the veto power made the prospect of
binding supranational law less threatening.'4 1
More
important in explaining why Member States accepted the increased power of EU law is the idea that not every expansion
of the EU lawmaking power came at the expense of the
Member States. 4 ' Rather, the enhancement of EU power
led to a concomitant enhancement of the strength of the
Member States.1 43
The legal/political bargain of the Member States had
several elements. Each Member State recognized that its
membership in the Community had more aggregate benefits
than costs.'
Further, apart from the general economic
benefits obtained from membership in the Customs Union,
each Member State saw the EU decisionmaking process, in
which it enjoyed a veto, as a means for resolving the issues it
faced as part of the European Union and as a nation. 4 ' This
was especially true for the small countries, which gained
bargaining leverage with the larger states as a result of their
veto power. 4 ' The large states gained the ability to pursue
their own interests more effectively by doing so on an EU-wide
basis. 4 ' Thus, even in an era when the Member State
governments distrusted supranationalism in theory, 4 ' legal
and political conditions combined to provide Member States
incentives for entering into a new system of binding
international legal agreements.
Unique characteristics of the European Union also
appealed to different segments of the Member States. Article
19 See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2426-27.
140

See id. at 2429.

141

See id.

142Id.
143 Id.
144
145
14 6
147

See id.

See id.
Id. at 2429 n.59.
See id.

1'4Id at 2428.
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177 enabled the judiciaries of the members states to expand
14
the scope of their power in cooperation with the ECJ.
More importantly, the system empowered the governments of
the Member States by enabling them to legislate binding law
while circumventing
their domestic lawmaking
procedures. 5 ' Thus, under the institutional structure of the
European Union, the two branches of the Member States
whose passivity, if not active support, was required to
strengthen the EU legal regime had their powers enhanced in
this process. The result was a legal/political equilibrium
within which the basic structure of the European Union's
lawmaking system developed.
3.4.2. Recent Developments
Recent developments have called into question the stability
of this legal/political construct. Many of the key doctrinal
developments started when the European Union had only six
members; when subsequent Member States joined, the
decisional mechanisms were not altered to incorporate the
additional members.' 5 ' As the European Union expanded,
the equilibrium produced by unanimous voting became more
precarious.' 5 2 In key areas of policy, the Council was unable
to make decisions effectively; this "decisional malaise"
culminated in a White Paper that criticized the paralysis of
the European Union in moving toward harmonized regulations
and a single market.' 5 3
This resulted in the Single
European Act ("SEA"), which reintroduced majority voting to
the European Union and strengthened the Commission's
position in relation to that of individual Member States.M
This development represented a change in the legal/political
bargain. A Member State no longer had the option of not
complying with EU legislation that it did not support.'5 5
149 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

o See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2430.
1 See id. at 2456.

152 See id. (explaining that achievement of unanimity became more

difficult as the number of Member States increased and cultural and
political homogeneity decreased).
15 See id. at 2456-57.
'54

See id. at 2458.

15 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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However, with the increase in the number of Member States,
this modification was essential to ensure the efficacy of the EU
decisionmaking power."'
Now that the terms of the original "bargain" have changed,
it is unclear to what extent the equilibrium can be
maintained. 15 7
One problem is the extent to which
Maastricht and other planned treaty-based expansions of EU
competence indicate that the European Union will become
involved in more areas that affect the sovereignty of the
Member States. An important-economic goal of the Maastricht
Treaty that has resulted in debate among the Member States
is the introduction of a common currency into the European
Union.'
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the EU Member
States were to move toward convergence of their main fiscal
criteria in preparation for the formation of a European Central
Bank and the adoption of an EU currency by 1997 or 1999.159
On August 1, 1993, as a result of the collapse of the French
franc, the European Union was forced to change the Exchange
Rate Mechanism ("ERM"), the fixed band within which the EU
currencies are supposed to fluctuate by 2.25%, to a much
looser arrangement permitting variances of up to 15%."'o
This development shook confidence in the European Union's
move toward a full monetary union and most likely ensured
that the transformation would not occur on schedule.' 61
155 See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2456-57.
"6

Id. at 2465.

158 See Europe's Future: In Their Hands?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1993, at

21 [hereinafter In Their Hands?].
15.See The Maths of Post-MaastrichtEurope, supra note 135, at 51
(describing the main criteria for monetary union as "low inflation, low
budget deficits, a stable exchange rate and a public debt limited to 60% of
a country's gross domestic product"); see also In Their Hands?, supra note
158, at 21-22 (providing that the target date for monetary union lies
between December 31, 1996 and January 1, 1999).
'" In Their Hands?, supra note 158, at 21. The pressure on the system
came from Bundesbank's (the German Central Bank) refusal to reduce
interest rates in the face of recessions in the other major EU countries. Id.
Because of Germany's fiscal imbalances, the Bundesbank placed the fulfillment of its duty to combat inflation at home above the interests of the other
Member States. See id. Under the Maastricht criteria, currencies of
nations on the fast track to a .common currency were to remain within
narrow 2.25% bands for two years before the eventual achievement of the
monetary union. Id.
161 Id. at 21-22.
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In the area of the free movement of goods it is likely that
the equilibrium will hold. In newer areas such as the currency
union, however, it appears that the strengthening of EU law
that occurred during the majority voting period may not be
sufficient to prevent the collapse of the equilibrium.'
Weiler posits the question in terms of loyalty to EU
institutions and whether Member States will be willing to
enter into a binding supranational system of law in which they
individually do not have a veto. 63 The ERM experience
suggests that this loyalty has not developed sufficiently to
allow unlimited expansion of EU competence. Despite these
potential threats to the furthering of EU competence, however,
EU trade law remains firm and continues to function well,
especially in comparison to the GATT.
The potential addition of new members to the European
Union could also disrupt the current voting equilibrium in the
Council. Three states, Sweden, Austria, and Finland joined
the European Union in 1995. With the addition of three new
small nations the current balance between large and small
states may be disrupted. In the sixteen-member community,
any eight small countries could veto the proposals of the other
Spain and Britain's resistance to the change in
countries.'
the number of blocking votes illustrates the difficulty of
changing the existing equilibrium. 6 5 Further, the addition
of new Member States required an increase the number of
Commissioners. 66 If the European Union permits additional
nations to become Member States it will have to modify its
institutional arrangements to arrive at a workable political
equilibrium.
16 See id. The controversy over the move towards a currency union
demonstrates the potential for the European Union's collapse as it struggles
with the major issues confronting it.
Under the system of qualified
16 See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2465.
majority voting, relatively small groups of states in various alliances can
still block Council legislation so that they are not completely succumbing to
the will of the majority. See The Maths of Post-MaastrichtEurope, supra
note 135, at 51 (describing the effects of the qualified majority voting
system).
16 The Maths of Post-MaastrichtEurope, supra note 135, at 51.
16 Still Stuck, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 64.

Spain and Great

Britain are resisting an increase in the number of votes required to block a
proposal in the Council of Ministers from 23 to 27. Id
166 See The Maths of Post-MaastrichtEurope, supra note 135, at 52.
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There are two conceptual viewpoints from which the
European Union might view its future development. The
participants might envision themselves to be in the process of
developing a federal state of Europe.'67 The emergence of a
European suprastate would involve the replacement of
Member State nationalism with a supra-European
nationalism."' 8 One problem with this approach is that by
replacing the national identities with a European identity, the
European Union will be restoring the national unit on a larger
scale. 6 ' In terms of the world trading system, this type of
development will likely to lead to additional protectionism and
inward-looking growth. Although it is possible that the
bargaining dynamic of the international trading community
would be simplified by reducing the number of participants,
this type of institutional matrix would prevent the
achievement of a new legal construct that accomplishes
regional objectives while enhancing global free trade.
Weiler advocates that the European Union develop towards
a "community vision" of the European experience.'
He
defines this vision as "premised on limiting, or sharing,
sovereignty in a select albeit growing number of fields, on
recognizing, and even celebrating, the reality of
interdependence,and on counterpoising to the exclusivist ethos
of statal autonomy a notion of a community of states and
peoples sharing values and aspirations."' 7 ' This conception
of the European Union does not contemplate the gradual
disappearance of the Member States, but rather a new level of
multinational interaction. The sense of European identity
would not eclipse national identity, and thus would not imply
an inward-looking or exclusive conception of the European
Union. Under this model the European Union would not
represent a threat to global free trade, but rather a step
towards the goal of liberalization.

16 Weiler, supra note 6, at 2479.
18

' Id. at 2481.
169
170

Id at 2482.
Id. at 2478-82.

171 Id. at 2479 (emphasis in original).
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3.5. Importance for Asian Nations
The history of the evolution of the European Union
suggests that the number of states involved in such regional
groupings plays a role in the effectiveness of the legal/political
bargain that can be achieved. It also suggests that merely
copying, even in part, the institutional features and doctrinal
devices that contributed to the European Union's success will
be difficult in the context of the GATT. There is a strong
argument that regional groupings with fewer member nations
are more likely to develop an effective and binding legal
structure. Participants in such a scheme can agree more
easily upon a legal/political bargain and develop the
institutions to produce a public-oriented, transnational legal
structure. This type of development would contribute to
further liberalization of the world trading system while
allowing its participants to address trade problems more
effectively on a supranational level. The EU experience
illustrates that such a regional structure does not necessarily
threaten participant states' sovereignty, and that national and
supranational policymaking can coexist.' 72
Thus, the
possibility that the formation of a regional grouping in East
Asia might enable nations in the region to achieve a legal/
political bargain should be considered in evaluating the
wisdom of such a course.
4. PARTICIPANTS IN AN ASIA-PACIFIC
REGIONAL GROUPING
4.1. APEC
An existing Asian grouping, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum ("APEC"), often is cited as having the
potential to develop into a trading bloc. This loose association
initially included the six ASEAN' nations, Japan, South
172 The division between the national and international policymaking
spheres is reflected in the doctrine of subsidiarity, pursuant to which the
European Union should leave to national policymakers those issues more
amenable to national action. See Peters, supra note 94, at 110-11.
178 The Association of South-East Asian Nations ("ASEAN") was
originally created as a political grouping in August 1967. Kenevan &
Winden, supra note 17, at 224 n.1. Recently, however, ASEAN leaders have
taken steps towards economic integration. See Michael Vatikiotis, Less
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Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada.174 Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke originally proposed the creation of APEC in January 1989.15 The first
APEC meeting was held in Canberra, Australia in November
1989.176
It was attended by the economic and foreign
ministers of the participating nations.177
Participants in the forum initially conceived of APEC as an
informal consultative grouping through which they could
formulate and implement common goals.' 78 At the Canberra
meeting APEC participants agreed to cooperate in the
Uruguay Round of the GATT, and to establish working groups
to plan concerted action in a number of trade and development
areas. 1"9 In early APEC meetings participants stressed the
informal nature of the association and rejected the idea of
APEC as a trading bloc. 8 ' All of the participating nations
also agreed that the underlying principle of the new grouping
would be to liberalize trade, and that APEC would be outwardlooking in perspective.'
The first APEC meeting did not result in the creation of
any institutional structure.'82 The ASEAN nations initially
wanted to have the APEC structure develop out of the ASEAN
Secretariat."
At that stage, however, the United States

Haste, Less Speed, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 7, 1993, at 61. For further
discussion of the efforts of the ASEAN economic grouping, see infra Section
4.2.
The ASEAN nations are Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Brunei. Kenevan & Winden, supra (citing SARWAR

HOBOHM, ASEAN INTHE 1990s: GROWING TOGETHER 1 (1989)).
114 Jacqueline Rees, FirstStep Taken, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 16, 1989,

at 10.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 The participating nations were Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New
Zealand,
the United States, and Canada. See id.
178

See ANDREW ELEK, PACIFIC ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION:
POLICY
CHOICES FOR THE 1990S 11 (1993).
179 Rees, supra note 174, at 10.
180 See ANDREW ELEK, TRADE POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC

REGION IN THE 1990s: THE POTENTIAL OF OPEN REGIONALISM 1 (1992).
See id.
182 See Rees, supra note 174, at 10-11.
181

"' See id.
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and Japan advocated an informal consultative process rather
than an established institutional framework.'8
APEC's
participants decided that the consultative process for
preparing future meetings would include the ASEAN
Secretariat.'
APEC leaders' unwillingness to develop an institutional
framework illustrates the key characteristics of the process at
the time. First, the lack of any formal mechanism prevented
the grouping from developing an institutional identity separate
from those of the participating nations. Second, the reluctance
of Japan and the United States to allow this new grouping to
develop independent bodies demonstrated the countries'
hesitation at creating a new grouping similar to the European
Union. One interesting feature of the new APEC structure
was its ties to the already-existing ASEAN institutional
framework.186 ASEAN as a grouping was assigned an
important role in charting the future course of APEC's
development.'
In recognition of ASEAN's importance to
APEC, the participants in the founding conference agreed that
alternate meetings would be held in an ASEAN country.'
In 1990 the second APEC conference was held in
Singapore.'
At this meeting the scope of the grouping was
further defined, and China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, the three
remaining economic powers of the region, were invited to
participate in APEC. "0 After the addition of the three countries, APEC members accounted for more than half of the
world's trade. 9 '
APEC also discussed regional trade
liberalization and resolved that any such liberalization only

184

Id. at 11.

185 Id.

18

Id.

187

See id.

188 Id.
"" See APEC Meeting in Singapore Said to Establish Group as Major
Forumfor Region's Interests, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1245 (Aug.
8, 1990) [hereinafter APEC Meeting in Singapore].
See South Korea and China Reportedly Discussing Chinese
Membership of APEC, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 17, 1990,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
191 See Robert Trautman, Global Trade Reform Said Vital for Rich, Poor,
Reuter Library Report, Sep. 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File.
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would be taken in conformity with GATT principles.192
Although APEC leaders decided that APEC would not
become an economic trading bloc, summit participants
specified that all regibnal trade liberalization would be in
conformity with GATT.'93 APEC leaders' creation of a
permanent secretariat in Singapore in 1992 indicates a
willingness on the part of the participants to conceive of APEC
as a more institutionally developed grouping with the potential
for becoming a free trade area."4
One important goal of the APEC grouping was the
successful completion of the Uruguay Round.'95 APEC
achieved substantial progress in building a united front for
GATT negotiations.' 96 In the period prior to the final
agreement on the Uruguay Round, various Member States as
well as an APEC Eminent Persons' Group proposed that in the
event of the failure of the Uruguay Round, APEC could act to
restore GATT rules among its members."9 '
The November 1993 meeting of the APEC forum in Seattle
engendered renewed interest in the organization. This summit
was the first meeting at the level of heads of state.' In the
period immediately preceding the Seattle summit, an APEC
Eminent Persons' Group released a report calling for the
establishment of a "community of free-trading nations as a
goal for APEC.""9 ' The report stated that APEC's existence
192
193

See APEC Meeting in Singapore, supra note 189, at 1246.
See ELEK, supra note 180, at 1.

l 4APEC Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement, 4 U.S. DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH 828, 831 (Nov. 29, 1993).
195

Awanohara, supra note 74, at 13.

19 See APEC Meeting in Singapore, supra note 189, at 1245.
197 See Susumu Awanohara & Nayan Chanda, Uncommon Bonds, FAR E.
ECON. REV. Nov. 18, 1993, at 16, 17.

'" Nigel Wilson, Perspective onAPEC'sFuture Course, AusTL. FIN. REV.,

Nov. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir did not attend the summit, and both Taiwan and
Hong Kong sent lower-level representatives to appease mainland China.
Fifth Annual APEC Forum Includes First Ever Regional Summit, KOREA
ECON. DAILY, Nov. 9, 1993, available in Westlaw, Koreaecon Database.
19
NarongchaiDefends Call for APEC Free Trade, BANGKOK POST, Nov.
12, 1993, availablein LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. In this article, the
Thai member of the Eminent Persons' Group stressed that a "community of
free-trading nations" would permit nonmembers agreeing to abide by the
guidelines of the bloc to receive the same trading privileges, drawing a
distinction between this kind of structure and a more inward-looking free
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would be in danger unless it redefined its role. " This bold
proposal proved controversial among a number of APEC's
member nations, especially the ASEAN countries.2 °1
At the Seattle meeting APEC leaders agreed on a
Declaration of Trade and Investment Framework and action
plan 2 2 and established a Committee on Trade and
Investment to facilitate a more open environment for
investment among the participating nations. 2 03 The leaders

authorized the Eminent Persons' Group to continue its work on
developing a larger vision for the future of APEC. 2° In
addition to enhancing APEC's organizational status and aim
at the Seattle meeting, APEC leaders invited Mexico and
Papua New Guinea to join the alliance. 205 After the addition
of Mexico, APEC encompasses all of the NAFTA countries.
in 1994, bringing APEC's total membership
Chile joined2APEC
06
to eighteen.

APEC is currently the main focus for the regional
trade area. Id.
200 Pilita Clark, Future of APEC at Risk, Say Experts, THE AGE
(Melbourne), Nov. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
Among other proposals, the Group called for coordination of member states'
monetary and macroeconomic policies. Id.
101 See Aimless in Seattle, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 35. Under the
leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir who advocates a solely Asian
grouping, Malaysia has led the opposition to an increased
institutionalization of APEC. See id. Indonesia has also expressed
reservations about enhancing the structure of APEC; its Foreign Minister,
Ali Alatas stated that, "[W]e in ASEAN see [APEC] as a grouping which
should not too quickly institutionalise." Eric Ellis & Peter Gill, Change of
Name Not on Seattle Agenda-The APEC Acronym, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Nov.
4, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
2
" Asia.PacificEconomic Cooperation(APEC),4 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH
835 (Nov. 29, 1993).
Z03 Declaration on an APEC Trade and Investment Framework, 4 U.S.
DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 832, 832-33 (Nov. 29, 1993); Awanohara & Chanda,
supra note 197, at 16.

See APEC Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement, supra note 194, at
828-29. APEC already has ten working groups that encompass various
See Asia-Pacific Economic
areas of trade and economic interests.
Cooperation (APEC), supra note 202, at 835-36. The working groups are
Trade and Investment Data, Trade Promotion, Investment and Industrial
Science and Technology, Human Resource Development, Energy Cooperation, Marine Resource Conservation, Telecommunications, Transportation,
Tourism, and Fisheries. Id.
2" Awanohara, supra note 74, at 13.
204

206 The Opening of Asia, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 1994, at 23, 24.
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integration policy of several of the most important nations in
Asia. Its primary champion, Australia, has been active in
trying to expand APEC's role because Australian leaders see
APEC as a vehicle for participation in the economic prosperity
of the Asia-Pacific region.20 7 Some ASEAN nations have
misgivings about expanding the scope of APEC due to a fear
that the organization could become an instrument of U.S.
foreign policy.2"' Malaysia, the country at the forefront of
this criticism, advocates the formation of an exclusively Asian
grouping. 0 9 Leaders of another ASEAN member, Thailand,
have concerns that APEC is too small to be an overarching
trading regime such as the GATT, and too large to form an
economic bloc. 210 The United States has adopted a cautious
attitude with regard to the future course of APEC in light of
current ASEAN hesitation.2
Following the Seattle Summit, the Eminent Persons' Group
was charged with developing a plan for implementing its
recommendations.2 12 In August 1994 the Eminent Persons'
Group released a report advocating the development of free
trade in the Asia-Pacific region as well as various other
institutional developments to combat free trade problems. 213
At the most recent meeting of the APEC leaders in Indonesia, following the recommendation of the Eminent Persons'
Group, the APEC .nations declared their intention to move

207 See Geoffrey Barker, Asia-PacificIs Future,Says PM, THE AGE (Melbourne), Nov. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. In
fact, prior to the summit Australian Prime Minister Keating suggested that
APEC change its name to the Asia Pacific Economic Community, signifying
a deeper and more substantial grouping. See Ellis & Gill, supra note 201.
Nevertheless, the name change never made the meeting's agenda. Id.
208 Awanohara, supra note 74, at 12.
20. Aimless in Seattle, supra note 201, at 35.
210 See id.

211 See Pilita Clark, US Official Warns ofAPEC Tensions, THE AGE (Melbourne), Nov. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
212 Barry Wain, APEC Still Struggling to Establish an Identity, Settles
Down to Task of FurtherOpening Tade, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994,
at A27.
21 Dan Biers, Analysts Downplay Need for Tariff-Cut 7imetable, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994, at Al. For example, to reduce the use of antidumping actions as barriers to free trade the EPG advocated the creation
of a task force to address the issue of anti-dumping as well as the
development of a dispute mediation service. Id.
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towards a free trade area by 2020.2"4 This result from the
latest summit demonstrated an advance in developing
institutional goals for APEC. The long timetable for the
achievement of free trade and indications that some of the
summit's participants did not intend to be bound by this
commitment suggests that APEC still has not determined that
it will become the nucleus of an institutionally developed
economic grouping in the near future." 5 Nevertheless, the
summit and the free trade declaration are likely to solidify
APEC's role as a potential economic grouping and provide
momentum for further institutional development.
Despite recent advances, the APEC structure remains
largely undeveloped. Because of the degree of consensus
required for the adoption of measures that APEC shares with
the GATT, many contentious issues remain unresolved.218
The large number of APEC members, and the ethnic and
geographical diversity among them, represent a distinct
setting for a regional grouping than the European Union, or
even the two regional groupings within APEC, NAFTA and the
ASEAN Free Trade Area ("AFTA"). Despite these problems,
the report and recommendations of the Eminent Persons'
Group, as well as the declarations at the Indonesian summit,
represent a far-reaching vision of an enhanced APEC emerging
as a strong, cohesive regional grouping ensuring free trade and
prosperity for its members. Thus, this organization, even at
its current infant stage, presents a potential context within
which the type of legal/political bargain described in Section
Two could lead to the formation of a regional group to develop
a new intermediate-level, hard international law.

214

A Dream of Free Trade, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1994, at 35.

APEC

members created a bifurcated schedule for trade liberalization under which
"developed" nations would agree to free trade by 2010 and "developing"
nations by 2020. Id At the conference itself, there was disagreement over
which countries would be considered developed. The United States argued
that by 2010, South Korea and possibly China would be developed, to which
Malaysia responded that Asian developing countries would still be behind
the United States in economic development at that time. Id.
215 See id. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir stated that Malaysia
would not consider itself obligated to completely liberalize trade if its
economy has not developed sufficiently. Id.
"16 See Awanohara & Chanda, supra note 197, at 17.
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4.2. ASEANIAFTA
The smaller ASEAN regional bloc of Singapore, Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei has already
formed its own free trade area, the AFTA. Originally a
political grouping, ASEAN inaugurated a regional trading bloc
in 1992, due in part to fear that the development of regional
trading blocs would leave the ASEAN nations behind. 17
While AFTA's goal of completion of a free trade area is
impressive, the provisions of its plan are not very ambitious.
The group aims to reduce tariffs to less than five percent in
fifteen years, and subsequently to phase out non-tariff barriers.21 8 Some AFTA members can delay their first tariff cuts
while others must start reducing tariffs immediately.2 1 9
This framework was necessary to ensure an agreement with
binding restrictions on the actions of the Member States.2 2 °
AFTA also permits two or more Member States to hasten the
schedule of tariff reductions between them if they so
desire.2"2 ' Several AFTA nations have lowered tariffs at a
more rapid rate than that demanded by the agreement.2 22
AFTA has also introduced rules of origin for trade with
members, requiring that at least forty percent of a product be
made by ASEAN countries.2 2 s Despite the potential for a
dramatic reduction in protectionism among AFTA members,
the low level of intra-ASEAN trade suggests that the
agreement will not have a significant effect in altering the
existing trade patterns of the AFTA countries.2 24
The agreement itself does not detail how or which nontariff barriers will be prohibited. Non-tariff barriers matter
most to the participating nations.2 25
The first year of
217 Gibney, supra note 12, at 22.
218 See Vatikiotis, supra note 173, at 61.
21' Malaysia and Singapore have already

begun to reduce their tariffs;
Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines will not start cutting certain tariffs
until 1996 and Thailand will not begin reducing tariffs until 1999.
Vatikiotis, supra note 173, at 61.
22 See Kenevan & Winden, supra note 17, at 225.
221 Id. at 227 (citation omitted).
222 Id.
at 232.
223 Id. at 227 (footnote omitted).
224 See Vatikiotis, supra note 173, at 61.
225 Michael Vatikiotis, AFTA, Mark H, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 21, 1993,
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implementation of AFTA was disappointing because only
Singapore and Malaysia made the required cuts in their tariff
rates.2 2 8 As a result of this limited success, the ASEAN
leaders relaunched the project a year later, and reduced the
time between the various countries' tariff cuts.2 27 They also
reduced the number of excluded items and added coverage for
unprocessed farm goods. 2 '
To enforce the terms of AFTA, ASEAN established a
ministerial committee, the Council, to monitor the Member
States' compliance with their obligations. 2 9 In addition, the
heads of state of the ASEAN nations are required to meet
every three years.2 30 While AFTA has started to develop an
institutional apparatus to administer its tariff reduction
program and free trade program, and this body could serve as
a nucleus for further institutional developments, the
structures currently in place are inadequate to implement even
limited AFTA objectives.
The AFTA agreement has many institutional features in
common with the GATT and the European Union.
Its
safeguard clause is consistent with Article XIX of the
GATT,231 and its general exceptions for areas of special
concern to the Member States are analogous to Article 36 of
the Treaty of Rome. 23 2
These provisions could provide
Member States a legal justification for evading their treaty

at 74.
226 Id.
228

Id.

Kenevan & Winden, supra note 17, at 226. The Council, in which all
member states have equal representation, cooperates with the assisting
ASEAN Secretariat in monitoring compliance. Id. Unfortunately, the
Council is a political body that is unlikely to exhibit institutional autonomy
in monitoring the compliance of the member states. See id. at 238. Further,
there is no specification of what role the Council should play and what
229

procedures it should adopt. I&
230 I& at 226.
231 See id. at 230-31. Under the safeguard clause, a country can suspend
its adherence to its obligations if imports of products similar or identical to

one of its domestic industries threaten to cause "serious injury" to that

industry. The general exceptions allow a government to restrict imports for
reasons of "national security, or the protection of public morals, plant and
animal life, and items of historical and archeological value." Id. at 231.
232 See EEC TREATY art. 36.
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obligations and introducing protectionist measures like
quantitative restrictions. In the face of these broad provisions
which are subject to differing interpretations, the mechanism
for determining the contours of the features becomes extremely
important. The dispute resolution procedures of AFTA are not
adequate for this task. AFTA members are directed to resolve
disputes amicably, and if that fails, to report the dispute to the
Council." 3 There is no indication of how the Council is to
This omission in the
arbitrate members' disputes.234
coverage of the agreement represents a significant deficiency
which, if not corrected, may prevent AFTA from evolving into
a more structured and developed legal grouping capable of
eliminating regional barriers to free trade.
An examination of AFTA, the only existing Asian trade
bloc, highlights the problems a larger Asian economic grouping
would face. First, the varying levels of economic development
among component members lead them to perceive their
interests as divergent. This discrepancy of interests impedes
agreement on the pace of the traditional course of trade
liberalization, the reduction of tariffs, and the elimination of
the most obvious quantitative restrictions.
A second problem with AFTA is that the relative
unimportance of intergroup trade means that Member States
do not receive significant economic benefits from their trade
concessions. A primary concern of the ASEAN nations is the
endangerment of their access to world markets, but the
opening of their neighbors' economies has a limited scope for
spurring their export trade. The lack of a major world
economy in AFTA to serve as a large export market and source
of investment, and to aid transfers also is likely to prevent
AFTA from playing a significant role.
Finally, AFTA's institutional structure in its current form
is not adequate to generate the endogenous institutional
development necessary to eliminate tariff and non-tariff
barriers and harmonize those substantive regulations of the
Member States that impact trade.235 Dependence on a
political body (the Council) for enforcement and dispute resolu-

233 Kenevan & Winden, supra note 17, at 236-37.
234

Id. at 237.

23 See id. at 238.
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tion will prevent the emergence of an autonomous body
devoted to the interests of the AFTA community.236 Thus
AFTA has more of a private-oriented structure which aims to
resolve issues as the parties would have originally wanted
rather than a public-oriented characteristic like that of the
European Union.
Despite these problems, AFTA represents a first step in the
evolution of an Asian regional grouping. Whatever the weaknesses and inadequacies in the terms and institutional
underpinnings of the agreement, AFTA serves as an
institutional framework upon which others might build. By
incorporating one or more of the larger Asia-Pacific economies,
AFTA could achieve an economic viability that would allow it
an important role in world trade. Further, AFTA is a
manifestation of the desire to create Asian alternatives to the
regional trading blocs which are developing around the world
and a response to the threat of regionalism posed by the
European Union and NAFTA. Section Five will further
explore AFTA's potential for serving as a building block for a
larger Asia-Pacific free trade grouping.
4.3. An Exclusively Asian Economic Grouping
Another proposed grouping of nations that could evolve into
a regional bloc is the East Asian Economic Grouping ('EAEG").
Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia is the foremost advocate
of such a grouping, which would include the geographically
and ethnically Asian members of APEC, but exclude the
United States, Canada, and Australia.2 3 7 Prime Minister
Mahathir's desire to form the EAEG stems from his fear that
the United States and Australia will use the APEC process todominate the Asian trade agenda and advance their own
interests, as well as a belief that the Asian members of APEC
share circumstances and cultural traits which would make
them more likely to find commonalities of interests.2 38 The
United States has "sought to block the creation of [EAEG] out
236 See id.

27 See Philip Shenon, The Pacific Summit; Boycott in Order,Malaysian

Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at A15 (explaining that Prime Minister
Mahathir supports EAEG, a solely-Asian grouping); Clark, supra note 200
(describing the composition of the proposed trade group).
2" See Manthorpe, supra note 1, at A12.
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of fear that it could become a trade bloc that would shut out
Western powers. " "
Japan, Australia, and other members of APEC have taken
very cautious positions on an exclusively Asian economic
grouping. 240 In July 1993 at an ASEAN summit meeting,
the major parties agreed that the EAEG could serve as a
subgroup of APEC, although they did not specify how such an
arrangement would be implemented or how broad or limited
its authority would be.24 '
The idea of an exclusively Asian economic grouping also
exists in the context of a possible yen bloc that could emerge
in East Asia.2"2 The Southeast-Asian and North-Asian
nations that would comprise such a bloc would be linked by
their trade with Japan, as well as their dependence on
investment from Japan.243
A closer look at the economic fundamentals suggests that
an exclusively Asian economic grouping might not be
economically feasible if it led to the exclusion of the United
States from the region's international trade.
Even in
Malaysia, the foremost proponent of the EAEG, U.S.
investment surpasses that of Japan.2
In addition, the
United States is Malaysia's foremost export market.245
Recognizing these economic realities, Malaysia's foreign
minister has stated that Prime Minister's Mahathir's emphasis
on ethnically Asian nations is the product of a past era.248
Because of the importance of the United States to both the
politics and economics of Asia, any grouping which excluded
the United States would probably be doomed to failure.247
230 Shenon, supra note 237, at A15.
240 See Aimless in Seattle, supra note 201, at 35.
241 See

id.

242 See Gene Koretz, Is the East Asian Trade Bloc Merely a Paper Tiger,

BUS. WK., Jan. 10, 1994, at 23. For purposes of this analysis, it would not
be necessary for these countries to adopt the yen as their reserve currency;
rather, it connotes the increasing economic integration of the North and
Southeast
Asian nations.
243
See id.
244 See Aimless in Seattle, supra note 201, at 35.

See id.
See id.
247 See Emily Thornton, Will Japan Rule a New Trade Bloc?, FORTUNE,
2

246

Oct. 5, 1992, at 131, 132. Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines depend
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5. LEGAL/POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF
AN ASIAN REGIONAL BLOC

This Section explores the general possibilities for the
formation of an Asia-Pacific regional trading group. By way of
methodological clarification, it does not attempt to fill a
predictive role. Rather, the aim of this analysis is to explore
some potential legal and structural characteristics of such a
bloc to highlight ways in which some or all of the nations or
groupings described in Section Four might be able to strike a
legal/political bargain leading to the emergence of a new level
of multinational legal interaction. The discussion of the
proposed groupings will draw on the analysis of the strengths
and weaknesses of the GATT-style and EU-style structures
described in Sections Two and Three.
The development of a regional grouping capable of
becoming a supranational structure analogous to the European
Union ultimately would require something more than the
gradual evolution of current institutions. Such a development
would require a political leap of faith and vision that
transcends the current understanding of the scope of national
and international law and the national interests of the states
involved. In the European context, the vision of Jean Monnet
and the desire of the main combatants of the World War II to
rebuild a peaceful Europe provided this crucial input.24 ' It
is unclear what stimulus could provide such an input in the
Asian-Pacific context. This discussion suggests ways in which
the legal and structural advantages of such a grouping might
provide incentives for the members of the Asia-Pacific
Community to take this important step. In addition, this
analysis demonstrates that the current conditions of the AsiaPacific trading community could make such a transformation
desirable to the participants in the near future.
One justification for a trade regime based on APEC or
another subset of the Asia-Pacific countries should be
distinguished from this analysis. One argument in favor of
on the United States as the primary market for their exports and the United
States is the second largest export market for Malaysia. U.S. Economic
Relations With East Asia and the Pacific, 4 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 554
(Aug. 2, 1993).
248 See John H. Barton, Two Ideas of International Organization, 82
(footnotes
1527 (1984)
REV.
MICH.
Published byL.
Penn
Law:1520,
Legal Scholarship
Repository,
2014 omitted).
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such a regional grouping is that even within an essentially
GATT-like institutional structure, the smaller number of
countries involved will make it easier for this subset of the
GATT community to make the concessions necessary to go
beyond Uruguay Round reforms and achieve a fairer and more
economically efficient trade regime.2 4 9 A similar theory is
that the creation of essentially a "fast-track" GATT, centered
in the most dynamic region of the world economy, would spur
the rest of the international trading community to make
comparable concessions."'
These arguments for an AsiaPacific grouping are not the subject of this analysis. At the
other extreme, this analysis is not a proposal to create a
federal state of the Asia-Pacific region, as such an idea is
beyond the mainstream of current political possibilities.
The nature of the potential structures proposed here, and
the reasons for moving towards such groupings, is that they
represent a qualitatively different legal paradigm from that
embodied in the GATT. The aim is to explore the possibility
of creating a legal structure that goes beyond the GATT legal
regime and addresses problems in the international trading
system. The European Union is such a model because it has,
in the eyes of many commentators, mutated into an advanced
form of binding international law. This Article adopts Weiler's
"community vision" of the European Union as the most helpful
way of understanding the development of EU law and the
interpretation of the EU experience most promising for transplant into an Asian-Pacific context.2 5 '
5.1. An Asian Grouping as a Public Institution
One factor that distinguishes the EU system from that of
the GATT is the European Union's public character.2 5 2 The
24 See Aimless in Seattle, supra note 201, at 35 (noting that Thailand

prefers a regional, more aggressive grouping).
250 See id. (arguing that an Asia-Pacific grouping could "prod Europe into
being more cooperative in the GATT round").
251 For a discussion of Weiler's "community vision," see supra notes 17071 and accompanying text.
252 As described infra Section Two, the Uruguay Round contemplates the
creation of a new institutional mechanism for the GATT system, the WTO.
See supra note 15. It is not yet clear what the role of this institution will
be, but it will likely assume a more public character. Cf Islam, supra note
26, at 79 (noting that at least one commentator believes that the WTO will
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss1/3
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most important characteristic of a public-oriented institution
is the existence of an interest distinct from that of its
individual members, and a structure to vindicate, to some
extent, that distinct interest.253 Public-oriented institutions
are not unusual in international law regimes. The degree of
power granted to such institutions representing the public
interest, however, distinguishes the EU experience. Within
the European Union, the Commission and the ECJ are the
primary loci of this public orientation, although the European
Parliament may evolve into an additional locus of EU
institutional identity. In the Asia-Pacific context, a public
orientation will be one of the important structural features of
any grouping seeking to advance beyond the current,
traditional international law model.
Neither of the two existing groupings, APEC or AFTA, has
developed a public orientation or institutional structures that
could gradually assert such an orientation. In AFTA the
absence is especially striking.254 Nevertheless, AFTA's lack
of an independent structural apparatus is consistent with its
limited goals, and the fact that its members conceived the
AFTA bloc as merely a local extension and deepening of the
traditional GATT-style regulation of international trade. 55
Further, the limited size of the grouping and correspondingly
low benefit level provide Member States little economic
incentive to move beyond the traditional interstate bargaining
paradigm.256
The APEC nations' reluctance to the development of a more
public-oriented institution is not likely to disappear in the
foreseeable future.257 Nevertheless, the importance and size
of inter-APEC trade could provide sufficient benefits to the
participating nations to agree to the creation of a publicbe "on par with the [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank").
2"3 For a discussion of the distinction between public- and privateoriented institutions, see supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
"" The AFTA Council is apparently modeled after the EU Council.
Although there is an AFTA Secretariat, its function seems somewhat
limited.
See Haas, supra note 5, at 838-39.
255
Id.
156 See Vatikiotis, supra note 173, at 61 (nothing that intra-ASEAN trade
in 1991 was only 19% of ASEAN's total trade).
"" See Joseph L. Brand, The New World Order of Regional Trading
Blocs, 8 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 163, 171 (1992).
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oriented institutional structure. 58
Initially it is unclear what grouping of nations would be
most amenable to the development of a legal regime at least
partially outside of the political control of the Member States.
At first glance, a smaller grouping like AFTA might appear
more willing to cede some of its power over trade to an
institution outside of the traditional interstate bargaining
process. AFTA has not yet reached this point. Likewise, the
doubts of some of APEC's members may prevent the
emergence of a locus of APEC interests to emerge. Even the
more ambitious members of APEC may be concerned about
ceding power to place the APEC agenda in the hands of an
autonomous body. Nevertheless, at some point, APEC Member
States' perceptions of the benefits to be gained by creating a
strong publicly-oriented institutional structure may convince
them of the desirability of such a course.
As discussed in Sections Two and Three, one variable that
determines the character of an international legal regime is
the number of participants. It was easier for the European
Union to create public-oriented institutions when it had only
six members with shared legal and other traditions than it is
for larger groupings.2 5 The increase in the number of EU
Member States has influenced its evolution, and has led to
various institutional reforms to accommodate
these
6
changes. ' Future increases in the size of the European
Union may threaten aspects of its public-oriented institutional
structure.2 6 1
The large number of APEC participants
indicates that APEC might be approaching the outer limit of
the number of members for which a strong public-oriented
structure is practical. If APEC desires to develop in such a
way it would be well served by suspending the incorporation
of new members until it has developed a sufficiently strong
structural base.A2

The proportion of such inter-APEC trade was 65% in 1992.
Awanohara & Chanda, supra note 197, at 17.
259 See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2405.
258

2 60

261

Id.

Id.

At the November Summit, APEC decided that after the entrance of
Chile there would be a three-year moratorium on new members.
Awanohara, supra note 74, at 13.
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One implication of the numbers problem is that a subset of
APEC including more than just the AFTA Member States
might reach agreement on a public-oriented institutional
structure that would elude APEC as a whole. Prime Minister
Mahathir's EAEG represents such a natural alternate
grouping. Because of the smaller number of participants
involved, cultural similarities, and the geographical closeness
of these nations, acceptable public-oriented structures might
develop more easily.
The development of a public-oriented structure is necessary
to allow an East Asian grouping to evolve beyond the existing
GATT-style paradigm of international law. While none of the
current or possible groupings have started to develop publicoriented structures, either APEC or the proposed EAEG might
move towards such an institutional structure in conjunction
with transition to a free trade area among their Member
States. It may be easier for EAEG than for APEC to create
this structure because of its smaller number of Member States
and cultural links. Nonetheless, if the legal/political bargain
struck by the participating nations is attractive, either of the
two groupings could develop an effective locus of publicoriented power to drive the evolution of a regional trade bloc.
5.2. Enforcement of SupranationalNorms
The second major characteristic of EU-type groupings is the
character of their legal constraints. One of the most striking
features of EU law is that nations take their EU obligations
seriously and treat EU law the same way as national law.2
Two types of developments enabled the European Union to
accomplish this improvement: (1) procedural devices through
which community institutions can intervene in the domestic
context, and (2) doctrinal developments that serve to justify
and legitimize such interventions. The potential applicability
of these institutional mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific context
is one possible inquiry. A related question is whether the
nations involved might develop alternative mechanisms to
accomplish similar functions.
One of the most important procedural devices adopted by
the EU legal system is the preliminary reference, a device
note Repository,
94, at 100-03.
Published26by See
PennPeters,
Law: Legalsupra
Scholarship
2014
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through which Member State courts can or must request legal
opinions from the ECJ."
This device is potentially very
intrusive into the domestic sovereignty of the states involved
because national courts must enforce decisions of a foreign
court. One reason for the acquiescence of the EU Member
States' domestic judicial systems to such an intrusion was the
prestige of members of the ECJ and respect for its legal
reasoning.2"
A comparable basis of legitimacy would be
necessary to introduce this type of mechanism into an AsiaPacific context.
The AFTA institutional structure does not include any
comparable devices in its program. 6 Its founders seem to
have conceived of the group as a GATT-type arrangement, not
a qualitatively different legal regime.2 67 At first glance it
also appears unlikely that the APEC nations would ever
collectively agree to include a device involving such
pronounced intrusions
into their domestic judicial
sovereignty.2 6 Although the EU Member States are hardly
uniform in terms of their legal systems, the degree of diversity
of the legal systems of APEC is considerably greater.2 6 9 In
addition, the diversity of political structures and sources of
legal/political legitimacy in the group would greatly increase
the difficulty of creating a community legal structure with
enough legitimacy to be accepted by the Member State
judiciaries.
A related problem for the countries of the Asia-Pacific
region is the weakness of the national courts in their
respective domestic contexts.
The reason for the
effectiveness of the preliminary reference device in the
European Union was the traditional deference shown by the
264 For a discussion of the preliminary reference, see supra notes 111-16
and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
266 See Haas, supra note 5, at 838.
267 Id at 840-41.
268 Id. at 839.
269 See Kunda Dixit, Australia: Asia Embrace Worries Media Watchdogs,
Inter Press Service, May 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
270 See id. (contrasting Australia's "independent courts, constitutional
stability and . .. free media" with those features of other nations in the
Asia-Pacific region).
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national governments to their national courts.2"' While the
democratic governments of the EU Member States had an
established tradition of obeying their courts, many Asian
nations have no comparable tradition. Thus, this particular
mechanism ofjudicial review is not likely to translate well into
an Asia-Pacific context. The weaknesses of the domestic legal
systems vis-a-vis their political masters reduce the likelihood
that the judiciary-empowering effect of this kind of mechanism
could contribute to the Member States' acceptance of the
multinational norms.
The second type of mechanism, the development of the
doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, will be less effective
in the absence of a means by which a multinational court can
intervene directly in the deliberations of domestic courts." 2
The principal advantage of the preliminary reference device is
that it equips private citizens to serve as private attorneys
general, enforcing the norms of the community law against
their respective governments in their national courts. 3
It is possible that the doctrines of direct effect and
supremacy could enter the judicial systems of the Asia-Pacific
nations indirectly through a form of juristic osmosis.
Alternatively, the treaty constituting the trade bloc could
incorporate these doctrines textually.
The principal
disadvantage of these approaches is that the various domestic
legal systems would interpret rulings differently, thus
reducing consistency and leading to differential enforcement
among participating nations.
Even if alternate channels of diffusion could serve as
surrogate means for realizing doctrinal advances, it is unlikely
that they would have the same impact in the Asia-Pacific
context that they had in the European Union. The use of law
to extend the strength and scope of community norms would
have less of a legitimating effect on members of either APEC
or EAEG because the groupings lack strong legal traditions
and their constituent members' governments are not
accustomed to abdicating their lawmaking responsibility.
Even in the APEC countries with autonomous judiciaries and

271
2
273

See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2420-21.
See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
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some tradition of judicial law-making the doctrinal advances
would not be met with immediate acceptance. In these
countries, questions of democratic legitimacy and
governmental accountability would impede acceptance of the
removal of key policy decisions from the domestic democratic
processes."" Thus, the intensive use of the domestic legal
systems of the Member States of an Asia-Pacific community is
not the most promising mechanism for increasing the
"hardness" of multinational community norms.
It is also possible that community norms might gain a
quality of hardness through other mechanisms. One other
means of development and enforcement of multinational trade
law is through the operation of public-oriented institutions
that assume the prosecutorial functions of private attorneys
general. In addition to the public prosecutor institution, a
grouping must have an adjudicatory body with enough
credibility to ensure that Member States fulfill their
obligations as determined by that adjudicatory body. Such a
mechanism exists in the European Union-the Commission
can bring Member States that violate EU norms before the
ECJ.275 In one sense the creation of strong community
institutions might be attractive to Asian members of a trade
grouping because many Asian economies are currently
controlled and directed by autonomous bureaucratic elites.276
Community institutions would resemble a replication of that
system on a multinational level. Conversely, the domestic
bureaucratic elites most likely would fight to defend their
274 Concern over the potential enforceability of WTO determinations in
the United States was one of the major obstacles to the U.S. Congress'
ratification of the Uruguay Round. See DancingRound GATT, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 26, 1994, at 25. On one hand, this resistance to accepting determinations of a more binding international legal regime is disheartening. On the
other hand, the compromise struck by the Congress in creating a new
institutional structure consisting of a panel of federal judges to review WTO
panel findings and evaluate whether rulings exceed the WTO's authority
represents an accommodation of the domestic legal system with a binding
international regime--an indication of a capacity for institutional adjustment. If the panel finds that such rulings exceed WTO authority three
times in five years, the United States will withdraw. Id. While this remedy
is draconian, the experience of the European Union suggests that shifting
such evaluations from a political to a judicial body is a promising step.
17 See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2419.
27
1 See Jonathan Braude, Leading Asian Slams Autocracy, So. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 3, 1994, at 5.
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privileged positions.
The interaction of the Member States in a more legalistic
context also could lead to greater compliance with community
law. This would require a more objective and effective form of
dispute resolution between the Member States than the means
used under GATT."' In the European Union, the ECJ performs the function of the arbiter of interstate conflicts over EU
norms, ensuring that the resolution of such disputes is based
on legal principles and not political leverage."' An effective
adjudicatory body is probably the best institutional means for
accomplishing this goal, assuming that it has credibility or
enforcement power sufficient to ensure Member State
compliance with community-related obligations.
Other dispute resolution procedures also could be
implemented. Some commentators have described NAFTA
dispute resolution procedure as an advance in multinational
dispute resolution." 9 In the NAFTA system parties to the
treaty are entitled to a panel hearing that is a more binding
version of the GATT panel procedure.2 "'
However, each
state that is party to the dispute must choose panelists from
a different country.2 8 1 This requirement helps ensure the
neutrality of the panelists and increases their credibility as
neutral adjudicators.2 8 2 NAFTA also provides for a different
form of dispute resolution for anti-dumping and countervailing
duty cases.28 3 For these disputes the domestic law of the
complaining party is the governing law, but binational panels
replace the domestic courts for judicial review purposes.'"

277

For a discussion of legal enforcement under GATT, see Richard H.

Steinberg, Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses to Trade Diversion Effects
of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 315, 338-

46 (1993).
"' See Shapiro, supra note 99, at 125.
279 See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 34, at 407.
28 0
Id. at 419.
281 Id.
at 421.
282 See id.
283 See id. at 430.
28 Id. at 430.
One interesting result of the current system utilizing
international bodies but domestic laws is that the panels utilize a different
standard of review depending on the originating nation. Id. at 434.
Eventually, NAFTA is supposed to develop its own norms to govern these
types of proceedings. Id. at 430.
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It is noteworthy that individuals in the NAFTA system can
gain access to review by these panels in cases in which they
had recourse to judicial review under domestic law."'5 The
combination of binding elements of the GATT multilateral
dispute resolution system and a more intrusive international
review of domestic determinations represents a hybrid system
which should contribute to a greater degree of legality in
decisionmaking.2 8 6 This hybrid system presents a possibility
for the future and lessons that may be valuable for the AsiaPacific experience.
The potential Asia-Pacific groupings are more likely to
prefer a form of interstate dispute resolution as the primary
Such a
forum for both norm creation and enforcement.
participating
the
of
governments
the
permit
would
structure
countries to have more control over the process of "hardening"
their regional multinational trade law.28 In addition, with
the large number and diversity of the nations in either APEC
or the EAEG, keeping the process of legal development at the
level of the Member States will not necessitate as great an
intrusion of foreign international norms on the domestic legal
systems of the Member States. The number of states in any
potential grouping will have less relevance to the successful
operation of the development of a public-oriented institution or
an effective dispute resolution procedure. The NAFTA system
of separating different types of actions into different
procedures also might make sense in an Asia-Pacific
context.2 8 8 The Asian members are likely to be concerned
about anti-dumping and countervailing duty litigation, and
hence accept a more intrusive bloc role in their resolution. In
addition, the fact that the three NAFTA members are part of
APEC" 9 may contribute to the acceptance of NAFTA-type
specialized interstate dispute resolutions.
The limitation of legal development to an interstate context
has disadvantages in comparison to the more direct
2 5

1

288

Id. at 431.
See id.

See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2426 (describing "hard lawmaking").
See Huntington, supra note 34, at 407 (providing an overview of the
three principal dispute resolution chapters).
289 See Gibney, supra note 12, at 21-22. Canada and the United States
are original members; Mexico was admitted in 1993. Id.
287
28'
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mechanisms utilized in the European Union. Because states
always have their own political agendas they are unlikely to
fulfill their prosecutorial function as effectively as private
citizens or public-oriented institutions. The emergence of an
institutional mechanism would partially alleviate this problem,
but the experience of the European Union suggests that there
are limits to what even a powerful institution can
accomplish.290 The EU Commission is too understaffed to
undertake any but the most high-profile prosecutions of
Member States violating community norms,291 and if it had
been the sole source of EU enforcement, the legal evolution
described in Section Three would have been considerably
slower. Nevertheless, this tradeoff of speed and effectiveness
might be necessary to make a hard multinational legal regime
palatable to the various participants in an Asia-Pacific
grouping.
Despite the greater number and diversity of potential
members of an Asian-Pacific bloc, potential legal mechanisms
exist to facilitate the development of "hard" law. Direct
translation of many of the institutional features of the
European Union into the context of an Asian structure will not
always be possible or desirable. Nevertheless, by creating a
public-oriented institutional structure and inaugurating an
effective system of dispute resolution the participating nations
would be able to gradually "harden" the norms of their
grouping and create an intermediate level of binding
international law. The possibility of such institutional
development would permit Asia-Pacific nations to develop the
legal framework if they could strike an advantageous legal/
political bargain.
5.3. Legal/PoliticalBargain
5.3.1. Initial Impetus
The preceding Section provided an overview of the
institutional mechanisms which based on the experience of the
GATT and the European Union appear necessary to develop a

290
291

See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2405-08.
See id. at 2419-20 (discussing deficiencies in the Commission's

enforcement).
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binding international legal regime. The most important
question still remains unresolved: might a community of
interest develop sufficiently to allow some or all of the
members of the Asia-Pacific community to agree to such a
regime or an institutional structure that could evolve into such
a regime. Various arrangements might be feasible, however
all such bargains involve a basic tradeoff: in return for
guaranteed access to a free trading regime within the group
with the progressive reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers,
participating nations must agree to limit their discretion to
implement domestic policy measures that impede free trade
between the member nations.2 92
The first question nations must answer is whether the
economic benefits the participants expect to accrue to them
will justify a cession of sovereignty. Asian nations depend
heavily on access to world markets for their current export-led
growth. "3 Until now they have relied on the GATT system
to guarantee them that access.29 4 As discussed in Section
Two, however, the limited success of the Uruguay Round and
the inability of the existing world trade framework to remove
obstacles to free trade have shaken Asia-Pacific nations'
confidence in the ability of the GATT to fulfill this
function.2 9 5 As a result, the Asia-Pacific trading nations
have a greater incentive to enter into an arrangement that will
ensure their access to necessary export markets.
The nature of the Asia-Pacific nations' dependence on
markets2 9 will influence the composition of a regional grouping. Only if the grouping succeeds in improving access to
critical markets will the participating nations gain sufficient
benefits to justify a commensurate surrender of their
sovereignty. Nations joining a new trade grouping will have
to ensure that their accession does not compromise their access
to the markets that are most important to their economies.
The increasing importance of intra-Asian trade suggests

292 See Vatikiotis, supra note 225, at 74.
293 See Andrew Sentance, Asian Waves Turning the Tide in the Their

Favour,EVENING STANDARD, Jan. 17, 1995, at 35.
294 See Richard J. Barnet & John Cavanagh, Creating a Level Playing
Field, 97 TECH. REv. 46, 47 (1994).
295 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
299 See Islam, supra note 26, at 79-80.
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that the need to ensure access to Asian markets might provide
a sufficient impetus for the emergence of an Asian trading
bloc.29 The Japanese market has the size and wealth to
induce the nations of East and Southeast Asia to agree to bind
themselves in a supranational legal framework with a
membership based on the EAEG.298 Further, Japan has
become the principal source of multinational investment
capital in Asia.299 Despite these market factors that suggest
the feasibility of an Asian group, there are problems with an
excessively Japan-centered group. Japan's markets have
traditionally been closed to non-commodity imports from
Southeast Asia and Japan runs large trade surpluses with all
the nations in a prospective Asian group.300 In addition,
Japan might not have sufficient incentive to enter into such a
grouping because it does not face excessive barriers in doing
business within Asia.301 Further, Asian political sensibilities
might recoil at a grouping that was too Japan-oriented for
historical reasons. The percentage of inter-APEC trade in
1992 was 65%, a greater proportion than inter-EU trade. 0 2
This suggests the large economic benefits that an APEC-based
trading bloc could offer.
The trade patterns of the Asian countries favor the
inclusion of as many nations as feasible given the political
dynamics of the grouping. In the choice between the EAEG
and APEC as a nucleus of a new grouping, the maximization
of the benefits of ensuring access to these markets indicates
the need for the inclusion of North America and Australia in
the new grouping because the Southeast Asian nations depend
heavily on access to these markets.0 3 In addition, the main
benefit that Japan could gain from its participation in such a
"' The share of East Asia's trade within the region increased from
thirty-three to thirty-seven percent in the 1980's. Koretz, supra note 242,
at 23.
2.8

See P. James Schumacher, Jr., Legal Disincentivesto JapaneseDirect

Investment in the United States, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 441 (1994),
availablein Westlaw, JLR Database.
219

See id.

See Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: America, Europe, and
East Asia, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 65, 73 (1993).
00

30
302
303

See Schumacher, supra note 298.
Awanohara & Chanda, supra note 197, at 17.
See Koretz, supra note 242, at 23.
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grouping would be ensured access to the U.S. market. Japan
also would benefit from the regularization, and to the extent
feasible the legalization, of its contentious trade relations with
the United States. The United States also might see its
membership in such a grouping as a means for resolving
current trade problems through ensuring its unrestricted
access to Japan and other Asia-Pacific markets.3
5.3.2. PoliticalDynamic
Once a core group of nations agrees upon the potential
benefits attainable via membership in a regional trade
grouping, the group must create an initial legislative-type
institutional framework. Such a norm-formation capacity
would be necessary to allow the new Asia-Pacific community
to expand the coverage of its trade related law to encompass
new areas. This institutional structure might also play a role
in the application of group norms to specific situations in a
dispute resolution or a public prosecutorial context. Because
of the limitations of its prosecutorial and juridical institutions,
an Asia-Pacific grouping would be more likely to expand the
coverage of its trade law through the legislative side of its
political structure.
As part of its institutional development process the AsiaPacific group will need a political structure that provides the
participating nations with enough input into the creation or
interpretation of binding supranational norms to justify their
compliance with such norms."'
Typically multinational
organizations have achieved this level of participation by
granting Member States veto power over measures with which
they do not agree. °6 As described in Section Three, the
European Union originally filled this need by requiring

...See Remarks by PresidentClinton to the CanadianParliament,supra
note 4 ("the dynamic economies in the Asia Pacific area... are growing very
fast, and we [do] not want this world to break up into geographical trading
blocks"); see also Martin Rudner, InstitutionalApproaches to Regional Trade
and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Area, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 159, 179 (1994) (explaining U.S. opposition to a solely-Asian
"exclusionary trading bloc").
3os See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2426-27.
38 See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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unanimity in all Council decisions."' 7 Such a voting rule
may be necessary to give the members of an Asia-Pacific group
sufficient input into the norm formulation process to enable
them to accept the substantive provisions that eventually
emerge. Unfortunately a rule of unanimous voting replicates
the traditional international law, treaty-based paradigm that
requires the consent of all parties to be bound. The large
number of states likely to be involved in either an EAEG-or an
APEC-based grouping would make a system of decision by
consensus as unworkable in the promulgation of compulsory
norms as it is in the current GATT system. 0 8 Thus, to the
extent a unanimous voting system is necessary to assure the
participating nations' eventual compliance with supranational
norms the number of participants in an Asia-Pacific grouping
should be kept as low as possible to avoid decisional stalemate.
As the number of EU Member States increased, successive
treaty revisions changed the system of unanimous voting that
The European Union
produced the decisional gridlock. 0"
struck a compromise between the need for validating input
into key decisions and the need for efficient procedures of
norm formulation by introducing a system of qualified majority
voting.3 1" Under this system either a coalition of small countries or several of the large countries can veto EU legislation.3" The EU system allows groups of countries with common interests acting in concert to veto legislation.3 1 2
A similar balance might be struck in an Asia-Pacific
grouping by providing that one or two of the larger,
industrialized members or a combination of smaller or less
developed members could veto legislative provisions of the
grouping. The hope would be that this kind of structural veto
would convince the Member States that their interests had
been included in the decisionmaking process and prevent them
from evading the binding obligations established by the group.
Over time, the operation of the group's institutions would also
create a sense of loyalty that would reinforce the binding
307

See supra note 136 and accompanying text.

o See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
SOBSee supra note 154 and accompanying text.
310 See id.
31

See id.

312

See id.
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nature of the group's legal norms.
A qualified majority voting system would offer participating
nations important benefits in ensuring them greater control
over decisions made by the group. Smaller countries acting in
concert could prevent the grouping from taking actions adverse
to their interests. The larger countries also would be able to
veto (either individually or in collaboration) measures that
were not in their interests.
One final feature of a binding supranational legal
framework is the effect such a system might have on the
domestic power of national governments. In his description of
the European Union, Weiler explains how the strengthening
of EU law allowed the governments of the Member States to
introduce binding norms into their domestic legal systems
without gaining the approval of their domestic legislative
branches."' 3
In this way the executive branches of the
Member States gained the de facto power to promulgate
international trade measures without going through their
domestic systems. This creation of a new level of "hard"
international law might appeal to the more authoritarian-type
governments in Asia who would like such a device to enshrine
their ability to bypass other domestic political institutions in
legislating in the economic sphere. 1 4 Of course, as a tradeoff, these governments would have to agree to abide by
supranational norms and decisions with which they might
disagree.
This aspect of the system might also raise
constitutional concerns in countries like the United States, in
which the respective competencies and functions of the
legislative and executive branches are clearly delineated.

6. CONCLUSION
This Article has presented a theory about the qualitative
nature of a supranational legal regime that can emerge from
a regional trading area with appropriate institutional
mechanisms. The model of development for this new type of
supranational law is based upon the institutional development

See Weiler, supra note 6, at 2413.
See Braude, supra note 276, at 5 (Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister
Anwar Ibrahim, referring to the "authoritarian posture of his own and other
[Asian] governments").
313
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experience of the GATT and the European Union. In contrast
to the classic international law structure of the GATT, the law
of the European Union has assumed a character more akin to
that of domestic law. Both the institutional bodies created by
the original treaties as well as the nature of the structural
equilibrium established by the combination of the institutional
bodies, voting rules, and interests of the Member States
present potential models for the creation of a regional trading
area in the Asia-Pacific region. Based upon the historical
development of the European Union and the current
configuration of regional groupings in the Asia-Pacific region,
Section Five presented examples of the types of legal/political
deals which might provide states in the region the incentive to
create regional trading blocs and the institutional forms such
groupings might assume.
This Article has implications in the debate over the
desirability of the move toward regional trading blocs. It
presents an alternative mode of developing transnational legal
regimes. Through the combination of certain institutional
structures and the legal/political deals they embody, the move
towards a regional trade bloc can introduce a new quality of
legal constraint to the actions of states in the areas of
international trade. This new "hard" international traderelated law promises to be more effective in removing barriers
to free trade.
As this new legal structure expands to
encompass more areas, it could also evolve into an effective
forum for dealing with other international policy concerns
including environmental protection and strategic stability.3 1 5
The possibility of developing this new level of legal interaction among Asia-Pacific nations serves as a compelling
rationale for the move towards a regional legal structure to
govern intraregional trade. In addition, the desire to gain this
legal benefit from the new structure could present an
independent criterion for carefully choosing the participants in
any such grouping to maximize the possibilities of generating
this new quality of supranational law and maintaining its
integrity. Many of the key distinctions between the EU
trading regime and the GATT framework appear to stem from
Since many of these difficult issues have a trade-related component,
it is likely that the regional legal structure will have to address them in a
trade context.
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the number of members and their mode of legal/political
interaction. These lessons can also assist proponents of a
regional trade grouping in creating a workable plan to gain the
benefits promised by the new form of international legal constraints, whether by limiting participation or by forming an
initial group that could expand once the institutional structure
developed.
Ultimately the move towards a qualitatively different type
of legal trading regime remains a political decision. Any shift
toward a model of legal interaction that could alter the current
understanding of the respective positions of national and
international legal structures could occur inadvertently once
the institutional structure has been put in place or as part of
a dramatic and conscious political leap of faith. The European
Union's historical experience exhibits both of these
characteristics, an initial leap of faith to the idea of a
European Union and a period of autonomous development out
of the eyes of the political leadership of the Member States. At
some point in the future, the political circumstances in the
Asia-Pacific region could lead to a comparable need for changes
in the structure of the norms governing international trade,
the experience and institutional development of the GATT, the
European Union, and the analysis of the legal/political
arrangements possible among the nations of the Asia-Pacific
region present a partial guide for the realization of these
political goals through legal and institutional structures.
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